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And No More Shall We Shout:
Noise By-Laws, Freedom of
Expression and a Montréal Sex Club
Richard Haigh* (with Batya Nadler)**

My partner and I recently attended a rock concert in Toronto. The band
was Iceland’s hottest (!) new group. We were seated in the balcony at
the very side, slightly behind the proscenium — not the most coveted
seats, although they afforded an incredible view of the inner workings of
the band. The seats were also less than 10 feet from the left-hand bank
of nine loudspeakers suspended from the stage gantry — speakers
whose purpose was to fill the concert hall with noise. I didn’t have a
sound meter, but from our vantage point, during its peaks, the noise
level must have been close to 120 dB.1
That night, as we left the concert and walked through a normal
Saturday night street scene in Toronto, a Harley-Davidson motorbike
accelerated past in a deafening roar. It was physically painful. From the
sidewalk where we were standing, as the bike passed us (again,
probably no more than five feet away at its closest point), my guess
would be that the noise level coming out of the exhaust was close to 140
dB. The bike put Iceland’s rock stars to shame.
Noise is a complex phenomenon. Like most of us living today, I
believe that I am subject to a lot more noise than previous generations.2
The urban soundscape is now filled with a cacophony of different
*

Visiting Professor and Graduate Program Director, Osgoode Professional Development.
I would like also to thank Irene Kim, for able assistance in researching and editing the paper, and
Michael Sobkin, for his useful comments on an earlier draft.
**
LL.B. Candidate, Osgoode Hall Law School, Class of 2008.
1
This is a very popular, but incorrect, method of stating noise levels. See Part II, below,
for an explanation.
2
At least, I feel that there is more noise now, but this is largely impressionistic. It is not
clear whether there is any objective evidence of increased noise. Despite many claims that noise is
getting worse, and despite the fact that there is a very good chance that it is, there are no accurate
measurements of city noise as a whole, nor are there longitudinal studies to indicate change over
time. See Harris, infra, note 28.
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sounds: from leaf blowers to car alarms to the staccato sounds of car
horns triggered by keyless ignition systems. At the same time, however,
noise is a conditioning phenomenon: after frequent exposure, the brain
becomes conditioned and stops treating noise as a warning signal. So,
unlike our ancestors who relied on hearing to sense danger, we treat
noise as largely benign. This brain adaptation also means that most of us
are not even aware of long-term changes in noise levels; we can get
used to chainsaws, automobile horns, construction equipment, car
alarms and the like.
The complexity is also due to noise being very personal. That
motorcycle offended me: not only did the noise hurt, but my postconcert reflective space felt violated. On the other hand, the HarleyDavidson driver no doubt loves and cherishes the noise of his unmuffled
V-Twin. Those who hate rock music might, at best, find a loud Icelandic
rock group annoying, but possibly irritating or even downright painful.
Is the big difference between the exhaust noise and the music a question
of consent? I was prepared for an evening of rock music; I did not
expect to have to endure the bleat of a Harley V-Twin at five feet.
Moreover, do we fully consent to much of the noise around us? Is noise
something that makes us truly human? And is the noise we create a form
of self-fulfillment, linked to our freedom of expression? Subjectivity is
crucial to understanding noise and its control.
Governments have not allowed noise control to fall on deaf ears.
The U.S. federal government, for example, far ahead of its time, enacted
the Noise Control Act of 1972.3 Other countries have also enacted antinoise by-laws.4 Because noise is localized, some cities have also
responded. In 1994, the City of Montréal attempted to deal with
troublesome noises by enacting a by-law dealing with the control of

3
Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4901-4918).
Although the Act is still on the books, it subsequently lost all support when Ronald Reagan took
office and cut all funding to its oversight agency, the Office of Noise Abatement. The Act is now
effectively worthless. For a good overview, see Charles W. Schmidt, “Noise That Annoys:
Regulating Unwanted Sound” (2005) 113 Environmental Health Perspectives A42.
4
Britain’s Noise Act 1996 (U.K.), 1996, c. 37, s. 4 allows for fines in response to noise
violations exceeding permitted levels of noise or emitted from devices not approved in the Act. The
Act is only to take effect in a particular locale if local authorities opt-in (s. 1). In 1998 the European
Commission created the EU Noise Expert Network whose goal is to help European countries
develop noise policies. In India, legislators added the Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control)
Rules, 2000 to s. 3 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (India), 1986, No. 29; these rules
regulate the noise levels in certain areas and establish “zones of silence” in others (i.e., near
hospitals).
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noise in the metropolitan area.5 The By-law became the subject of
litigation. Eventually, the case, known as Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366
Québec Inc. (“Montréal”)6 reached the Supreme Court of Canada. This
short comment will, after providing a brief case summary, focus almost
entirely on the Court’s section 2(b) analysis. It is left to others to
comment on the approach to section 1.

I. THE CASE
2952-1366 Quebec Inc. operated a club, Chateau du Sexe (the “Club”),
located on a main thoroughfare in downtown Montréal. In order to
attract customers and compete with a similar establishment on the same
street, the Club installed loudspeakers outside of the building, which
broadcast a play-by-play of the goings-on inside. On May 14, 1996 a
police officer on patrol in downtown Montréal charged the Club under
articles 9(1) and 11 of the By-law, which reads:
9. In addition to the noise referred to in article 8, the following
noises, where they can be heard from outside are specifically
prohibited:
(1) Noise produced by sound equipment, whether it is inside a
building or installed or used outside;…
11. No noise specifically prohibited under articles 9 or 10 may be
produced, whether or not it affects an inhabited place.

The Club appeared before the Montréal Municipal Court. It argued
that in enacting the provision the City had exceeded its delegated power
to control nuisances and that the provisions constituted an unjustifiable
infringement on its right to freedom of expression guaranteed under
section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.7 The
Municipal Court ruled that the City had not exceeded its jurisdiction and
that the By-law did not restrict the guaranteed right.8 The Club appealed.
At the Superior Court, the conviction was overturned on the grounds

5

City of Montreal, By-law R.B.C.M. c. B-3, By-law concerning noise (1994) [hereinafter

“By-law”].
6
[2005] S.C.J. No. 63, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141, 258 D.L.R. (4th) 595, 2005 SCC 52
[Montréal cited to S.C.R.].
7
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982 c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
8
R. c. 2952-1366 Quebec Inc., [1999] J.Q. no 2890 (M.C.).
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that the provision did in fact violate the right to freedom of expression
as protected by the Charter.9 That decision was upheld by a majority of
the Quebec Court of Appeal.10 Justice Fish (as he then was), in his
majority reasons, held that the City had not adequately established that
the specific noise compromised peace and order and therefore
unjustifiably violated a right to freedom of expression. Justice
Chamberland, in dissent, argued that the provisions were in fact a
reasonable and demonstrably justifiable limit on the right to freedom of
expression as the City had no other way to eliminate noise pursuant to
its legitimate authority to ensure peace and public order and to regulate
nuisances. The City appealed.
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded, in a 6-1 decision, that the
By-law was a reasonable limitation on the right to freedom of
expression. Chief Justice McLachlin and Deschamps J., writing for the
majority, based their conclusion on a contextual reading of the
concerned provision followed by a constitutional analysis in which they
articulated a revised approach to freedom of expression in public spaces.
In a stinging sole dissent, Binnie J. criticized the majority decision for
its application of a method of contextual analysis generally reserved for
crafting constitutional remedies and rarely, if ever, used for statutory
interpretation. In his opinion the By-law was ultra vires the City as it
infringed on freedom of expression and was not saved by section 1.
Even if it were to be held intra vires Binnie J. found that it would
constitute an unreasonable exercise of the City’s delegated legislative
power.
Both judgments agree that in order to properly ascertain what the
legislation is attempting to protect against, the Court must engage in a
process of contextual interpretation. This will be based not only on an
analysis of the specific wording of the clause but also on the broader
context. While both the majority and dissent agreed that the prohibition
in article 9(1) infringed on the guarantee of freedom of expression, they
parted company on the application of the contextual analysis and the R.
v. Oakes11 test for reasonable limits on guaranteed rights under section 1
of the Charter.12
9

Montréal (Ville) c. 2952-1366 Quebec Inc., [2000] J.Q. no 7289 (S.C.).
Montréal (Ville) c. 2952-1366 Quebec Inc., [2002] J.Q. no 3376, [2002] R.J.Q. 2986,
217 D.L.R. (4th) 674, 167 C.C.C. (3d) 356 (C.A.).
11
[1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
12
Montréal, supra, note 6, at paras. 82-85, 166-67.
10
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1. The Jurisdictional Issue
The first step for the majority was to determine the purpose of the By-law.
A brief review of the history of anti-noise legislation in Quebec initiated
the discussion.13 This revealed that previous laws were enacted to combat
noise in order to “preserve the peaceful nature of public spaces”.14 The
notion of “disruption” was found to be the common theme contained
within the entire By-law. Reading this theme into article 9(1), the majority
held that the provision contained an implicit recognition that any disruptive
noise that negatively influences enjoyment of the environment can be
restricted. The majority concluded that the provision was focused on noise
emanating from the specified sources — in this case the loudspeakers —
and this could be differentiated from environmental noise. This purposive
and contextualized approach resolved, for the majority, the explicit
ambiguity of article 9(1). In intention and scope, it fell within the City’s
delegated authority to regulate and define nuisances.
Justice Binnie, in contrast, argued that the impugned article was not
ambiguous at all. He highlighted three general categories of anti-noise
legislation: (i) prohibition of noise exceeding objective measurable
limits; (ii) prohibition by subjective criteria; and (iii) prohibition by
source. In his view the majority had converted article 9(1) from a
category (iii) prohibition into category (ii) by reading too much into the
By-law. The City’s intention, as exemplified in the strict wording of the
By-law (and as argued by counsel to the City) was to regulate noises by
source (a category (iii) prohibition).15 To Binnie J. it was evident that,
based on a grammatical reading of the provision, the lawmakers
intended to impose a general ban on all noise whether a nuisance or not.
The lack of precision in article 9(1), compared to other provisions, was a
blatant decision to create an unambiguous but sweeping and allencompassing clause.16 By adding the words “in addition” at the
beginning of article 9, the lawmakers were attempting to chart a new
direction for the fight against noise pollution — imposing a sourcebased ban without assessing the quality or impact of the noise
emanating from that source. The broad language of article 9(1) led him
to conclude that it was ultra vires the City as “noise” in itself is not a

13
14
15
16

Id., at para. 18.
Id., at para. 22.
Id., at para. 103.
Id., at para. 117.
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nuisance. The City’s right to define and/or prohibit nuisances was not
unlimited and generally requires noise by-laws to have expressly
specified, quantitative or qualitative, limits.
2. The Constitutional Issue
Both the majority and dissent agreed that article 9(1) infringed section
2(b) (Binnie J. simply agreeing with the majority on this point).17 The
majority began its constitutional analysis by applying the test for
freedom of expression set out in Irwin Toy v. Quebec (Attorney
General).18 This requires examining whether: (i) noise has expressive
content; (ii) the method or location of that expression excludes it from
protection; and (iii) the By-law infringes on that protection in either
purpose or effect. They concluded that, regardless of its message, the
noise had expressive content as expressive activity is not precluded from
protection simply by virtue of its message.19
For the second part of the test the Court scrutinized the place where
the noise was emitted. At issue was the scope and extent of the street as
public space. The majority then set out a series of guidelines to assist in
determining the type of public space that attracted section 2(b)
protection. For them, in determining whether restricting expression
would undermine the values of democratic discourse, truth finding, and
self-fulfillment, history and actual function of a place must be
considered.20 The historical use of a place provides an indication as to
whether protecting expression in that venue has, in the past, supported
the core values. Assessing the actual function of a place highlights if,
while being public in nature, it is essentially a private place. If so, the
right to free expression should be attenuated. At the core of this analysis
is the question of whether free expression in any place would undermine
the values the guarantee is intended to advance.21 The Court’s intention
in expanding on this point was to “provide a preliminary screening
process” that would limit to a certain degree the broad protection

17
18

Id., at para. 166.
[1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 58 D.L.R. (4th) 577 [Irwin Toy cited to

S.C.R.].
19
20
21

Montréal, supra, note 6, at para. 58.
Id., at para. 74.
Id., at paras. 75-77.
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enabled by the courts within a section 2(b) analysis.22 Applying the
analysis to the facts, the majority held that permitting noise on a busy
Montréal street falls within the purposes of section 2(b) protection.23
Finally, the Court found that the ban on the specified noise infringed
freedom of expression by restricting expression that promoted the
values of self-fulfilment and human flourishing, both of which are wellknown purposes underlying the free expression guarantee.24
Disagreement arose, however, over whether article 9(1) could be
saved as a reasonable and demonstrably justifiable limit prescribed by
law under section 1 of the Charter. The majority argued that the City’s
objective, namely the fight against noise pollution, was both pressing
and substantial. In the two-pronged proportionality test from R. v.
Oakes,25 they found that the limit on noise emanating from sound
equipment was rationally connected to the objective. Noise pollution
can be limited by a city in order to maintain the quality of public space.
The measure was also found to impair the guaranteed freedom in a
reasonably minimal way. A number of reasons were given. First, the
majority was hesitant to interfere with elected officials’ discretion in
dealing with what was deemed to be a serious social issue. Secondly,
regulating degrees of loudness, a solution presented as an alternative to
the impugned legislation, would not adequately balance the need to
allow businesses to maximize commercial expression with the public’s
desire for peaceful streets. This was bolstered by the City’s submissions
that there were no other practical ways to deal with the problem. Finally,
the City, in a (strange) submission, argued that any over-inclusiveness in
the By-law could be corrected by the judicious use of prosecutorial
discretion.
Justice Binnie accepted neither the proposition that there were any
limits in the relevant provision that were properly “prescribed by law”,
nor that article 9(1) was a “[proportionate] response to the legitimate
problem of noise pollution”.26 A provision should be either of no force
and effect (hence unconstitutional) or it should justifiably limit a right
(constitutional) — it could not be made effective with a warning to

22
23
24
25
26

Id., at para. 79.
Id., at paras. 58 and 81.
Id., at para. 84.
[1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
Montréal, supra, note 6, at para. 167.
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prosecutors to exercise discretion in the application of the impugned
provision. The City’s argument, according to Binnie J., was dangerous.
In addition, Binnie J. took issue with the majority’s contention that
the Club could advertise its business through other means in order to
avoid contravening the By-law. He argued that Montréalers have a right
to freedom of expression which includes the right to utilize their own
preferred mode of communication. They are entitled to challenge a law
that limited their preference of communication especially if that law
infringed on their rights to a degree that was entirely disproportionate to
the City’s objective.27
Although stirring, in the end Binnie J.’s judgment was a lone, and
futile, shout. The majority allowed the By-law to stand.
The decision is the first Canadian case of which I am aware that
deals with the constitutionality of anti-noise by-laws. Although both the
majority and dissent do devote some time to an overview of urban noise
regulation in Quebec, there is, in my view, a conspicuous omission of
science in the decision. A proper understanding of the science of noise
and its control is fundamental to analyzing how sound might
legitimately affect freedom of expression. The next section is a brief
attempt to redress that.

II. A SHORT PRIMER ON NOISE AND NOISE POLLUTION28
As mentioned, noise is a very complex phenomenon. In part, this is due
to the difficulty of measuring it. Noise is usually measured in decibels
(dB) on a scale from zero to 120 dB (theoretically, there is no upper
limit; practically it is around 140 dB). The scale begins at zero, which
was set to correspond roughly to the least powerful sound wave a very
sensitive ear can hear, set at a pressure of 2/10,000 of a microbar. The
human ear is able, however, to perceive a huge range of sounds beyond
that level. As a result, the decibel scale is logarithmic, so as to
accommodate the complete range of over a million different audible
sound pressures, from 2/10,000 to 200 microbars (one million discrete
steps). A 20 dB increase on the scale is therefore equivalent to a 10-fold
27

Id., at para. 174.
Much of this part comes from Cyril M. Harris, ed., Handbook of Acoustical
Measurements and Noise Control, 3d ed (New York: McGraw Hill, 1991). It is obviously an
extremely basic discussion about sound. One would have hoped for much more detailed and
complete submissions to the Court on the science of sound.
28
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noise level increase. Ambient room noise is usually between 50-60 dB
on the A scale (see below); aural discomfort occurs at about 120 dBA
and the threshold of pain is generally accepted as 140 dBA.
The complexity of measurement is accentuated by the fact that there
are a number of different decibel scales. The standard form of
measurement is the decibel “A” scale, or dBA. The A scale tries to
replicate the way the human ear hears — less sensitive to very low
frequencies and very high frequencies. It does this by weighting high
and low frequencies differently in a precise manner. Other scales
include the B scale, the Perceived Noise Level scale, the Effective
Perceived Noise Level scale, the Noise Criterion Level scale, and the
Speech Interference Level scale. All of the different scales attempt to
combat specific problems that invariably occur in quantifying sounds.
Each is something of a compromise. To be precise, therefore, proper
noise level measurements must indicate the scale that is used.
Not only is it important to specify the scale, it is almost meaningless
to identify specific levels of sound without stating the distance from the
source of the noise. Because sound can be directional and ambient, it
can fill an entire room or project directionally from a specific source;
because it can occur in short bursts or continuously, and it may dissipate
differently depending on direction and the medium it is travelling
through, there is no point in trying to understand noise levels without
relating them to the location of a sound meter. Normally, sound pressure
levels drop off about six decibels for every doubling of distance. As an
example, an electric shaver can register 75 dBA at two feet; at 20 feet,
the same razor sound is only 55 dBA, which is about 25 per cent of the
original loudness level. Distance, therefore, can have significant effects
on perceived loudness.
Finally, there are the subjective elements of sound, mentioned
earlier. To a listener’s ears, the same sound can vary depending on his
or her location relative to the sound source. Moreover, under identical
conditions on a different day, the listener can perceive a completely
different sound level. And since noise control can also occur without
actual noise reduction — by changing the design parameters of
buildings, road and subway rights-of-way, for example — the policy
choices expand considerably. There is thus a large human element
at play.
All this means that noise control is an incredibly complex mix of
science and art. When it intersects with freedom of expression, the
problems of analysis multiply. It is no wonder that both legislatures and
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courts have a difficult time with it. The Supreme Court is to be
commended for trying, but it is unfortunate that it did not have the
benefit of more scientific information on noise (or, if it did, it is
regrettable that it did not refer to it at all in its judgment).29

III. DID THE COURT GET IT RIGHT?
Ever since the beginning of section 2(b) jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court of Canada has been careful not to stake out much judicial territory
in regards to the Charter’s commandments of freedom of thought, belief,
opinion and expression.30 The analytical framework for a section 2(b)
analysis, carved out by Dickson C.J. in Irwin Toy, has remained
virtually intact. The test, as it has stood for almost 20 years now, is to
establish whether the activity is expressive; if it is, then to assess
whether the expressive activity takes an unprotected form in which case
there is no breach of section 2(b) (violence being a common example of
an unprotected form). If the form is protected, then the question is
whether the governmental response infringes upon expression in
purpose or in effect. If the purpose is infringing, the analysis shifts
immediately to section 1; if the effect is to infringe, then the three
rationales of free expression — as an instrument for democratic
government, an aid to the search for truth and the marketplace of ideas,
and a tool for individual self-fulfillment and autonomy — must be
engaged or else the legislative provision or equivalent is deemed not to
offend section 2(b). The test seems relatively complex, but since the
Court has defined expressive activities to encompass almost any form of
human endeavour (an activity is “expressive if it attempts to convey

29

Whereas the Supreme Court of Canada did not refer to scientific knowledge on sound,
the Quebec Superior Court has done so in a class action case involving noise at a railroad yard: see
Paquin c. Cie de Chemin de fer Canadien Pacifique (2004), IIJ Can 11397, at paras. 59 and 97
(S.C.), revd [2005] J.Q. no 15794, 2005 QCCA 1009 (C.A.).
30
Although each of these fundamental freedoms may be distinct, for purposes of this paper
it will be assumed that expression is sufficient to enclose all three concepts. As an interesting aside,
it should be noted that the Court has been reluctant to express any opinion on the differences
between the four — as expression is the form of activity that manifests itself publicly, it is much
more likely to be the one that is regulated or controlled by government, and visible and open to
public scrutiny and censure.
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meaning”)31 virtually all of the work in freedom of expression cases
occurs at the section 1 stage.
Arguably, this broad interpretation of section 2(b) has not been
overly problematic. The biggest challenge the Court has faced so far has
been determining the scope of expression in the areas of hate literature,
pornography and commercial speech. All of these involve some form of
direct, natural or unadorned human activity (however distasteful): in
speech or song — the natural human voice; in painting or drawing —
the artistry of the human hand; in commercial advertising — the wit,
wisdom and saleability of human-invented signs and typefaces. There
has been little conceptual difficulty in determining these to be
expressive forms of activity.
What about expression that is less directly “human-centred”, or that
requires technology to produce? Where the medium and the message are
both connected and distinct? As was noted, article 9(1) of the By-law in
Montréal was just such a provision. The starting point, for these
situations, is the Court’s decision in Ford v. Québec (Attorney
General).32 In it, the court rejected a distinction between a message and
its medium, at least for language. As the Court noted:
Language is so intimately related to the form and content of
expression that there cannot be true freedom of expression by means
of language if one is prohibited from using the language of one’s
choice. Language is not merely a means or medium of expression; it
colours the content and meaning of expression. … That the concept of
“expression” in s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter … goes beyond mere
content is indicated by the specific protection accorded to “freedom of
thought, belief [and] opinion” in s. 2. … That suggests that “freedom
of expression” is intended to extend to more than the content of
expression in its narrow sense.
.....

31
Irwin, supra, note 18, at para. 41. See also Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons
of Ontario, [1990] S.C.J. No. 65, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232, at 244 S.C.R. [hereinafter “Rocket”]; R. v.
Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at 729, 826 S.C.R. [hereinafter “Keegstra”].
(Dickson C.J.’s glib example of parking a car as a potential form of expressive activity in Irwin Toy
has always provided the lodestone for me for what could be considered “expressive”). In fact, the
most radical addition to the definition was allowing “threats of violence” to be characterized as
“expression” — see Keegstra at para. 35.
32
[1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, 54 D.L.R. (4th) 577 [Ford cited to S.C.R.].
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It has already been indicated why that distinction is inappropriate as
applied to language as a means of expression because of the intimate
relationship between language and meaning. 33

Then, in Irwin Toy, the Court seemed to take a slightly different
tack, recognizing that shouting may be a form of communication
severable from content:
“Expression” has both a content and a form, and the two can be
inextricably connected.
.....
In showing that the effect of the government’s action was to restrict
her free expression, a plaintiff must demonstrate that her activity
promotes at least one of these principles. It is not enough that
shouting, for example, has an expressive element. If the plaintiff
challenges the effect of government action to control noise, presuming
that action to have a purpose neutral as to expression, she must show
that her aim was to convey a meaning reflective of the principles
underlying freedom of expression. … how it relates to the pursuit of
truth, participation in the community, or individual self-fulfillment and
human flourishing.34

Finally, in Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada35
Lamer J. added the criterium of location — where the expression occurs
can affect the analysis of whether freedom of expression is breached:
The fact that one’s freedom of expression is intrinsically limited by the
function of a public place is an application of the general rule that
one’s rights are always circumscribed by the rights of others.
.....
In my view, if the expression takes a form that contravenes or is
inconsistent with the function of the place where the attempt to
communicate is made, such a form of expression must be considered
to fall outside the sphere of s. 2(b).36

33

Id., at paras. 40, 42.
Irwin, supra, note 18, at paras. 41, 53.
35
[1991] S.C.J. No. 3, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139 [hereinafter “Commonwealth”].
36
Id., at paras. 19, 21. Note that not all judges agreed with Lamer J.’s analysis of time,
manner and place restrictions being read into s. 2(b) — L’Heureux-Dubé J. expressly rejected this
idea and put this analysis into s. 1.
34
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But since these cases, the Court has not addressed the issue further
(or, it has not really had the opportunity to do so) as none of the
intervening cases have been concerned with the medium of
communication. Montréal, however, was such a case. It provided the
Court with an opportunity to revisit its analytical approach to section
2(b), at least as it relates to specific places and forms of communication.
That opportunity was only half taken.
1. The Good News: A Renewed Appreciation of Context
The majority in Montréal continued the Court’s tradition of treating
section 2(b) broadly, but they did add something new — a rejuvenated
understanding of the relevance of the manner and place of
communication in an analysis of expression. Unfortunately, the
discussion centred on appropriate uses of public spaces, while the
method of communication was given short shrift (as will be discussed).
The Court refined its approach from Commonwealth:
Expressive activity should be excluded from the protective scope
of s. 2(b) only if its method or location clearly undermines the values
that underlie the guarantee. … [I]n determining what public spaces fall
outside s. 2(b) protection, we must ask whether free expression in a
given place undermines the values underlying s. 2(b)
.....
The basic question with respect to expression on governmentowned property is whether the place is a public place where one would
expect constitutional protection for free expression on the basis that
expression in that place does not conflict with the purposes which s.
2(b) is intended to serve, namely (1) democratic discourse, (2) truth
finding and (3) self-fulfillment. To answer this question, the following
factors should be considered: (a) the historical or actual function of the
place; and (b) whether other aspects of the place suggest that
expression within it would undermine the values underlying free
expression.37

This is a new, and in some aspects, welcome approach. For one, the
test is expressly broadened to include the method of communication as
well as location. As the majority notes, “[t]he evidence does not

37
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establish that the method and location at issue here … impede the
function of city streets”.38 Secondly, the majority takes the view that
expressive activity in public spaces can be prohibited without offending
section 2(b). Later on they comment that “[the test] reflects the reality
that some places must remain outside the protected sphere of s. 2(b).
People must know where they can and cannot express themselves and
government should not be required to justify every exclusion or
regulation of expression under section 1.”39 In other words, there may be
occasions where it is not necessary to resort to section 1 in order to save
regulations restricting expression. The long-standing view that most, if
not all, the heavy lifting in freedom of expression analysis is done at the
section 1 stage has been firmly modified. Any lingering doubts about
the importance of context in expression cases, left over from the lack of
unanimity in Commonwealth, have been laid to rest.
2. The Not-So-Good News: More Factors and a Missed Opportunity
Two aspects of the decision remain a disappointment. The first is a now
almost mundane complaint about the growing use of “factor” analysis in
the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence. For example, there has been no
lack of criticism to section 15 after the Law test and its dignity factor
analysis.40 It relies heavily on trying to weigh and balance different, and
sometimes contradictory, factors. There is now a similar requirement for
section 2(b) where location is in issue: the need to review a place’s
historical and actual function, and whether “other aspects of [a] place”41
might engage freedom of expression values. The difficulty with any
factor analysis is assessing how to weigh each one. The Court seems to
understand and prepare itself for this eventuality, noting that “some
imprecision is inevitable”.42 But is this good enough? How does one go
about assessing the historical and actual function of a place? To take just
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two examples arising from the case itself: what if the historical and
actual functions of a place are diametrically opposed? Should
governments be able to regulate this form of expression because the
“government function […] require[s] privacy” or not regulate because
there is a historical precedent of free expression?43 Or, as a second
example, is rude behaviour now controllable in a courtroom or
legislative houses, because it amounts to “other aspects of a place” not
subject to constitutional protection? Without additional guidance as to
how these factors are to work, lower courts will more than likely end up
with decisions that are all over the map, requiring further Supreme
Court intervention to clarify. It is an inherent problem in any form of
factor analysis that judicial discretion and subjectivity tend to
predominate over principled analysis.
The second, and more fundamental problem is a growing unease I
have with the lack of sophistication in the basic section 2(b) analysis. It
is no doubt true that expression should be protected and governments
should have to justify encroachments on it. It is also correct, in my view,
to continue to respect the three underlying values related to the purpose
of freedom of expression. However, it may be time to take a fresh look
at whether other principles should inform the idea of expression, and
whether manner and form of expression (or, to use the language of the
Court, the “method or location”) are, in some situations, distinguishable
from expression itself. Montréal provided a perfect opportunity to
engage in this debate on the specific issue of amplification. That
opportunity was squandered.
Noise, as has been shown, is sometimes only peripherally connected
with expression. If there is any “expression”, it is often not direct human
expression. In the case of a rock concert or a club promoting its
operations remotely through a loudspeaker, the expression begins as a
human voice, but the soundwave is then electronically processed and
reconstructed as amplified sound. In the case of a Harley-Davidson
motorcycle, the “expression” comes from the workings of an internal
combustion engine.44
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Id., at paras. 75, 76.
As an interesting aside, there has been an attempt to “trade-mark” the sound of a HarleyDavidson engine. This was, thankfully, short-lived. See Harley-Davidson Trademark Registration,
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, February 1, 1994. After six years of legal proceedings and no
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The initial reason for conjoining form and content in Ford was in
the context of a language dispute. As the Court in that case noted, any
distinction between form and content is “inappropriate as applied to
language as a means of expression”.45 That argument holds considerable
weight. No one would want freedom of expression to exist in one
language but not in another. But there have been few reminders in
subsequent cases of the need to keep the two together. The passage from
Ford, above, has not been repeated since.46 In Irwin Toy the Court
mentions the “inextricable connection” between form and content but
then proceeds to acknowledge that the two can be disconnected.47 On a
very limited number of occasions, therefore, has the Court admonished
against artificially separating the medium and message. In other words,
the distinction, specifically announced in Ford in the context of
language, has not been applied in other areas, and has certainly not been
part of a broader debate on expression by sound amplification.
Amplification changes expression simply by its nature as a
“medium”. It is not equivalent to earlier concerns, since dismissed, as to
whether commercial labelling,48 advertising,49 or banning advertisements
directed at children,50 are expressive. Neither should it be thought of as
simply accentuating what a person standing on a soapbox should be
entitled to say. Amplified sound is much more. It is equivalent to asking
whether the same man-on-a-soapbox rules regarding expressive content
should apply to Superman standing on a tower of mega-size detergent
boxes. It is only peripherally an issue about freedom of expression;
more likely, it is a question of freedom to expand expression beyond
normal human agency. In any event, there is no doubt that it is
something requiring a full discussion in the context of a section 2(b)
analysis. It goes to the heart of what is “expression”, deserving of much
more than the Court’s conclusion that “[i]t is clear that noise emitted by
loudspeakers from buildings onto the street can have expressive
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content”.51 There is, therefore, a larger question at stake when one is
considering whether a city could suppress a noise like the 140 dBA
Harley, while leaving famous rock groups alone. It will now have to
wait for another suitable case.52
Moreover, as mentioned in the introduction, part of the analysis of
noise, if it is to be a form of expression, should require a consideration
of consent. And one would think that consent should form part of any
discussion involving context. Acoustical engineers define noise as “any
unwanted sound”53 If a person does not like a sound, therefore, the
scientific literature considers that to be noise. What could be more
contextual than that! In any event, the Court did not consider whether
anti-noise by-laws need to be more tailored for purposes of section 2(b).
Loud advertising might be supportable in a late night, sex club area like
St. Catherine’s street but not in the leafy district of Outremont.
There may be another chance soon — although given the Court’s
trepidation to stray outside the basic facts of a case, this may be overly
optimistic. A case from the Ontario Court of Appeal, Vann Niagara Ltd.
v. Oakville (Town)54 has been given leave to appeal to the Supreme
Court. The case concerns a municipal sign by-law prohibiting billboard
signs within the town’s borders. Again, the issue is whether the by-law
infringes expression. It is another case where the medium and the
message are not necessarily connected. Like amplification, is it possible
to imagine that at some point, the size of a sign (like the volume of
sound) becomes more important than the message contained therein?
We live in a world where extravagant excess is fashionable: Super-size
meals, booming car stereos played with the windows down (whose main
purpose, therefore is to promote the owner’s prowess, not to listen to
music), and now billboards that use full-scale school buses or multi-
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storey video images (again, not so much as to promote a product as to
promote the size and scale of the manufacturer). If Marshall McLuhan
knew, in 1964, what his legacy would produce, he may well have
thought that because the medium is the message, the medium will
become louder or larger at the expense of the message. It is hoped that
the Court realizes the need to engage in some of these ideas about the
nature of expression itself at the first stage, rather than rely almost
exclusively on the straitjacket of section 1.

IV. CONCLUSION
People are annoyed, distracted and kept awake at night because of noise.
Cities would be more pleasant places to live if there was less of it. For a
very large part of the population, noise is the most serious of pollutants.
The consequences may not be as tragic as an outbreak of e. coli in the
water supply, but the impacts of excessive noise are more immediate on
more people. It is an effect that is more immediate and identifiable than
breathing polluted air, having contaminated streams or lakes or living
shorter lives because of low-level contaminated foodstuffs.
At the same time, cities are now international competitors in the
world economy. Events such as the Olympics and large-scale theatre
spectacles, or destination architecture, are sought after by cities in open
competition. High-level bargaining and diplomacy are required for this
task, so that cities now have dedicated departments of commerce,
tourism and trade working full time on the politics and pursuit of these
“mega” events. The billions of dollars generated, controlled and/or
distributed by organizations like the International Olympic Committee
gives it the global clout to interfere, not just with state governments, but
city ordinances and by-laws. It seems reasonable to expect that a city
may decide to control noise as a result of some of these possible
external factors.55 In the end, the Supreme Court in Montréal did allow
the By-law to stand because of section 1 of the Charter. The conclusion
is good — it is only the lack of a deeper analysis of section 2(b) that
disappoints.
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Cities themselves have an increasingly large impact upon national
identity, as well as being a popular forum for its expression. Although
early concerns about globalization focused on the loss of the
independent nation-state versus the global Leviathan, this has been
proven to be overly simplistic.56 The new globalization model sees
economic power shifting in both directions: to the global and local
levels simultaneously. As Thomas Courchene coins it, the new process
is one of “glocalization”, noting that nation states are now “too large to
tackle the small things in life and too small to address the large
things”.57 Cities are thus required to develop local statehood, so as to
engage in international competition with other cities, while also
expanding capacity to deliver local services, some of which are targeted
at attracting foreign tourism and investment. Creating the climate for
this occurs in many ways, one of which is to design and implement
policies that distinguish one city from another. The city “branding”
becomes crucial to this success. Cities are slowly transforming into
commodities.
The City, therefore, becomes an expression in itself. Seen in this
way, a quiet city is, conceptually, little different from an amplified
noise. In a sense, neither are what should pass for “expression” or
“expressive activity”. Both are symbols. But if one is a collective of
like-minded people wanting quiet, and the other is a technological
process involving electrons moving through wires, which is really the
more human?
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